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China’s Presence in Africa
François Lafargue
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Jonathan Hall 
1 Quite early on, at the time of the 1955 Bandung conference, the People’s Republic of
China was still in state of revolutionary euphoria, and displayed an interest in Africa
because the dark continent had become a battleground in the struggle between the
West and the Soviet Union 1. One visible sign of China’s interest was the building of the
so-called Tazara 2 in East Africa, to provide support to independence movements like
Unita  in  Angola  3.  China  was  also  the  first  non-Arabic  country  to  recognise  the
provisional government of Algeria, which was set up in 1958. Nonetheless, after the
death of Mao Zedong, China’s presence in Africa became more discrete, confining itself
to certain states like Benin. For the last few years, however, China has been showing a
more marked interest  in Africa,  as  can be seen from Hu Jintao’s  visit  to Egypt and
Gabon, followed by Algeria in January 2004. 
2 This article will outline the present state of Sino-African relations, before analysing the
reasons behind the current rapprochement and its possible lines of development. 
A renewed partnership between China and Africa ?
3 Trade between China and Africa may still be modest, but it has grown significantly. In
2003  the  total  value  of  the  transactions  between  the  two  was  US$18.5  billion,  as
opposed to US$12.39 billion the previous year.  Currently China is  one of  the major
trading partners with many African countries (Gabon’s second largest client after the
United States, second largest supplier of goods to Benin, fifth largest to South Africa,
sixth largest to Algeria,  etc.).  Chinese companies in the field of Building and Public
Works (BPW) have become competitors  with French conglomerates like Dumez and
Bouygues.  In  recent  years  China  has  vastly  increased  its  infrastructural  building
projects 4,  this being a sector in which it  has undeniable expertise and competitive
ability. Despite all this, Africa is still terra incognita for China.
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4 In West Africa, when the president of Benin, Mathieu Kérékou, took power in 1972, he
was supported by Peking, and he re-established the diplomatic relations severed since
1967. Mr. Kérékou made three visits to China, in 1976, 1986 and 1998. China built the
Benin Friendship Stadium in 1982, followed two years later by the Manucia factory for
making cigarettes and matches. From May 1987 to April 1993, China and Benin were
partners  in  the  Associated  Benin  Textiles  Industries  (SITEX)5.  China  also  built  the
Lokassa hospital for them in 1997.
5 However, the African continent currently accounts for only 2.3% of China’s exports,
and 2% of its imports6.  And Sino-African commerce consists predominantly of trade
with South Africa, which represents 20% of the trade with the continent as a whole.
This situation is perfectly normal, since the South African economy is still the most
dynamic in the region,  with a  GNP equivalent  to  that  of  all  the other  sub-Saharan
African states combined. China’s second major customers are Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco
and Algeria, followed by Sudan and Benin (See Table 1). 
 
1- Trade between China and Africa in 2003. (in billions of dollars)
6 China’s  financial  activity  in  Africa  is  another  notable  feature.  Everyone  knows
nowadays  that  China  is  the  primary  recipient  of  direct  overseas  investments,
amounting to US$53 billion in 2003, but is actually also now one of the major sources of
such  investments.  In  2003  China  was  fifth  in  the  world,  after  the  United  States,
Germany, the United Kingdom and France. Its overseas investments totalled US$2.087
billion, which represented an increase of 112% over the amount for 2002, and made it
an  active  presence  in  160  countries.  China  is  investing  massively  in  raw  material
deposits overseas, and is multiplying its trading partnerships in order to secure regular
supplies. China’s presence has undergone rapid expansion in both Latin America and
Africa.  In 2002 its  total  overseas investments (leaving aside Hong Kong and Macao)
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amounted  to  US$5.083  billion,  of  which  25% were  in  North  America,  9.5% in  Latin
America, 8.7% in Africa, and 8% in Australia. The main recipients of Chinese investment
in Africa are Zambia 7, South Africa, Mali, and Egypt (see Table 2).
 
2- China’s total investments in Africa between 1979 and 2002.
7 China’s arrival in Africa provides African countries with a new horizon. Unlike France
and the United States, China makes no specific political demands, and allows African
countries  to  retain  complete  sovereignty.  China’s  only  demand  for  entering  into
commercial  relations is  a  complete break of  links with Taiwan 8.  But Peking allows
African countries to vote as they please at the United Nations, does not propose to
deploy  any troops  on their  territory,  and above all  refrains  from lecturing African
governments on democracy. Its intention to re-establish relations was marked in 2000
by  the  foundation  of  the  Forum  on  China-Africa  Co-operation  (FOCAC).  Nearly  all
African states belong to this organisation 9, and it commits China to adopt measures to
support African economies (such as lowering customs duties, and granting tourist exit
visas to Chinese citizens etc.) 10. The first meeting of this forum was held in Peking in
December 2000, and the second in Addis Ababa in December 2003.
8 China has agreed to take a more active part in peace-keeping operations in Africa. In
January 2005, 598 Chinese soldiers served with UN blue berets in Liberia. China also
sent forces,  though less numerous, to the Western Sahara as part of UN operations
there, and to Sierra Leone.
9 Co-operation with Peking offers further real advantages. China provides know-how to
its  raw materials  providers,  plus  a  labour  force, low-interest  loans,  and  favourable
financial  conditions  for  infrastructural  building  projects.  It  does  not  restrict  its
presence  in  Africa  to  the petroleum-producing  countries,  and  is  expanding  its
commercial activities in East Africa, particularly in Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya, the
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China  Road  and  Bridge  Corporation  (CRBC)  is  currently  among  the  leading  BPW
companies in the country. China has also built the Tambach-Kabarnet road in the West
and  renovated  the  Mombasa-Nairobi  road.  The  CRBC  has  set  up  its  regional
headquarters in Nairobi, and this provides it with a base for developing its activities
throughout East Africa.
China’s motives for its presence in AfricaOil deposits
10 Peking has become very anxious about China’s energy dependency 11. In 2000, it was the
eighth leading oil importer, and by 2003 it had risen to number four, after the United
States,  Japan and Germany. This year it  will  probably be number three. In 2000, oil
imports represented 27% of its total consumption for 1999, rising to 37% in 2002, and
are calculated to reach 45% in 2005. Such dependency presents major obstacles to the
global role that China intends to play. Until 1990, its principal suppliers were Indonesia,
the  sultanate  of  Oman,  and  Iran.  Extending  the  list  of  its  suppliers  has  become
imperative  because  of  its  increasing  domestic  consumption  and  the  depletion  of
Indonesian  reserves  12.  Naturally,  Africa  has  become  a  tempting  territory  because,
following US intervention in Iraq, that country has consolidated its control over all the
countries of the Middle East, with the exception of Iran. Added to which, the deposits in
the Caspian Sea have been disappointing, only representing somewhere between 2%
and 4% of global reserves, according to conflicting estimates. China is especially fearful
of American initiatives in this area of the Caucasus, of which GUUAM 13 is an example.
Founded  in  1996  with  the  joint  support  of  the  Organisation  for  Security  and  Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, this organisation is intended to
advance  economic  and  military  co-operation  between  its  member  states  in  close
collaboration with the United States, and to deal with such matters as the fight against
terrorism, the settlement of local conflicts,  etc.  The five founding members share a
common platform in refusing the presence of Russian forces on their territory. But one
of the main aims of GUUAM is the building of a supply network, independent of Russia,
with the support of the Atlantic alliance. Peking shares Moscow’s view that GUUAM is a
mechanism for allowing Washington not only to pursue a policy of encirclement aimed
at Russia, but also to expand it later to include China 14. Admittedly, China is attempting
to  bypass  GUUAM through rapprochement  with  Kazakhstan,  but  still  the  threat  of
encirclement weighs heavily on it. So Africa allows Peking to reduce its dependency on
these energy supplies, since the African continent possesses 8.9% of global oil reserves
15 and  represents  11%  of  global  production.  China  is  currently  the  second  major
importer of African oil, after the United States. Africa supplies 25% of its requirements
as opposed to 15% in the 1980s (see Table 3).
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3- Percentage share of China’s main oil suppliers
11 Hu Jintao’s African tour of Egypt, Gabon and Algeria in January 2004, was part of this
drive to extend the number of China’s oil suppliers. In Libreville, Hu Jintao signed a
joint  accord with his  host,  Omar Bongo,  for  the prospecting and production of  oil.
Likewise,  the  Total-Gabon  company  and  the  Sinopec  (China  Petroleum  &  Chemical
Corporation) signed a sales contract to supply China with one million tons of Gabon
crude in 2004. Peking has become the third major purchaser of oil from Gabon, after
the  United  States  and  France,  and  trade  relations  between  the  two  countries  are
expanding.  For example,  over 60% of Gabon’s timber is  exported to Asia,  mainly to
China. And China has given US$2 million to Libreville, and has granted a further US$6
million as an interest-free loan. 
12 During this  same African tour,  various agreements were signed a few days later  in
Algiers,  mostly dealing with oil  supplies.  Relations between Algeria and China have
always  been close.  The  commercial  and technological  links  which  were  established
straight after independence have been growing in strength ever since. The China State
Construction  and  Engineering  Corporation  (CSCEC),  which  is  China’s  leading  BPW
company,  has  frequently  won public  works  contracts  in  Algeria.  China  is  currently
Algeria’s seventh largest overseas supplier, and in 2002 Sinopec signed a 420 million
euro  contract  to  develop  the  Zarzaitine  oilfield  in  the  Sahara.  Another  Chinese
company, the China National Oil and Gas Exploration, is also due to build a refinery in
the Algerian desert, near Adrar.
13 China  is  an  ever-growing  presence  in  the  exploitation  of  the  oilfields  in  Congo-
Brazzaville. In 2003, it imported a million tons of Congolese crude oil, which is 1.5% of
its total imports. Oil is the Congo’s primary export commodity, and provides two-thirds
of the national budget’s revenues. In 2003 its production levels stood at 11.3 million
tons, and official figures forecast the same amount for 2005. The French conglomerate
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Total produces two-thirds of this Congolese black gold, followed by the Italian ENI. On
February  23rd  2005,  Sinopec  signed  a  contract  to  allow  it  to  exploit  the  off-shore
deposits known as “marine 12” and “deep sea C”.
14 Operating through the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), China also takes an
active role in the Sudan, together with the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
of which it is a 40% shareholder, in the exploitation of the Muglad basin. This joint
venture  has  built  a  1,500  kilometre  pipeline  to  take  the  oil  from the  south  of  the
country to the Marsa al-Bashair harbour terminal  near Port-Sudan on the Red Sea.
Currently Sudan alone is believed to account for 7.7% of China’s total oil imports.
15 But the United States also has its eye on these African oil and gas fields, so Africa now
finds itself as a field of conflict between these two powers.
16 Bill Clinton’s whistle stop tour of Africa in 1998 16 marked a visible turning point in US
policy  towards  Africa,  because  until  the  1990s  US  relations  with  Africa  were
characterised  by  complete  indifference.  Sure  enough,  the  Americans  were  quick  to
recall some of their initiatives in the area, like their support for the creation of Liberia
in 1847 or their commitment to the independence movements after the Second World
War. But Africa’s share of trade with the United States stood at 1%. Another sign of this
indifference was the fact that for three centuries only four American presidents had
made an official visit to Africa : Franklin Roosevelt to Cairo in 1943, Jimmy Carter to
Nigeria and Liberia in 1978, Bill  Clinton in Spring 1998, and George Bush five years
later. In recent years the United States has shown far greater interest in Africa.
17 With regard to US energy needs, Africa (especially Nigeria and Angola) has become one
of its major suppliers of petroleum 17, and US imports from Nigeria amount to over half
the quantity imported from Saudi Arabia.  With the support of the World Bank, the
United  States  also  intends  to  bring  the  deposits  in  Chad  on  stream  18 and  it  has
participated in building a pipeline leading to a terminal in Cameroon. The relaxation of
American  economic  sanctions  against  Libya  in  February  2004  also  promises  to
encourage a return of investments to that country.
18 There is no doubt that the clearest example of Sino-American competition in Africa is
the situation in Equatorial Guinea. This small country of half a million inhabitants has
brought  its  deposits  on  stream  with  the  help  of  American  companies,  particularly
Exxon  Mobil,  Chevron  Texaco,  and  Triton  Energy.  At  present  the  US  is  Equatorial
Guinea’s main trading partner, making it the third largest oil producer in sub-Saharan
Africa  19,  after  Nigeria  and  Angola.  But  China  has  maintained  close  relations  with
Equatorial Guinea since its independence in 1968, and is also taking a keen interest.
China buys a large part of Equatorial Guinea’s timber production, and is its third most
important  customer  after  the  United  States  and  the  former  colonial  power,  Spain.
China is multiplying its investments in local undertakings. A new road, from Bata on
the coast to Mongomo in the country’s eastern province, is being built with technical
and financial assistance from Peking.
19 China and the United States are also clashing over oil deposits in Angola. American
companies have been present in the country for over twenty years, and half of Angola’s
oil  production is  shipped to  the United States.  But  China has  also  become a  major
player,  buying  one-third  of  the  overall  production.  In  October  2004,  in  return  for
financial aid, it obtained a 50% share in the Block 18 oilfield, which had previously been
held by Shell, but was also fervently sought after by the Indian state-owned company
ONGC-Videsh 20. On February 26th 2005, during a state visit, the Chinese Vice-Premier
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Zeng Peiyan finalised several contracts with the Sonangol company. And relations are
continuing to strengthen. Proof of this is provided by the granting of extraction rights
in Block 3/80 (in the north of the country on the same latitude as the city of Soyo) to
Sinopec, at Total’s expense, which lost its operating licence. In 2004, China approved a
loan of US$2 billion to help in infrastructural redevelopment. There are about twenty
projects in progress. Angola repays its creditor with oil exports. The arrival of Chinese
joint  operatives looks set  to  make the Chinese community in Angola the largest  in
Africa.
Commercial reasons 
20 For  Chinese  companies  Africa  offers  new  commercial  prospects.  Although  trade
between China and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa is still comparatively marginal,
it has nonetheless made considerable progress in less than a decade. China sees Africa
as a source of raw materials (such as coal from South Africa and ore from Gabon) and a
market for its manufacturing industry. There too, just as in the rest of the world, China
is  eradicating  its  competitors  in  textiles  and manufactured goods.  She  also  sees  in
Africa a market which allows it to test its industrial products, and to offer them to less
demanding customers. The Zhongxing Telecom company is multiplying its outlets in
Africa  (for  example,  renovating  the  telephone  network  in  Djibouti),  including  the
Maghreb countries.  With 900 million potential consumers, the African market holds
considerable promise. And as in Europe and the United States, China can rely on well-
established communities, in both the French-speaking West African countries and in
those of East Africa. Even though the Chinese populations in the Maghreb countries are
minuscule  (there  are  barely  a  thousand  in  Morocco),  they  are  markedly  larger  in
Senegal, Kenya and Tanzania. And despite the way in which Chinese companies tend to
become the focus of discontent, being accused of customs evasion and of competing
unfairly  with  the  local  less-structured  economies,  African  governments  retain  a
favourable  attitude,  believing  that  the  Chinese  intrusion  is  a  way  of  injecting
competitive dynamism, bypassing traditional commercial methods.
Diplomatic issues
21 The African continent is also a scene of confrontation with Taiwan 21. One-third of the
states that recognise Taiwan are African : Gambia, Burkina-Faso, Liberia, Malawi, Chad,
Swaziland, Saõ Tomé and Principe. Senegal severed diplomatic links with Taiwan on
October 26th 2005. On January 1st 1998, Taiwan had lost its leading African supporter,
South Africa, when Nelson Mandela opted to open diplomatic relations with Peking,
after South Africa had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade China to agree to a policy
of  dual  recognition.  For  its  part  Taiwan,  despite  its  contacts  22 and  the  relations
established under the apartheid regime with business and military circles, was unable
to dissuade Mandela from recognising the PRC.  So the remaining African countries
which currently recognise Taiwan have limited economic importance and diplomatic
influence 23.  But in the diplomatic arena too, China has a major card to play in the
attractiveness of its enormous market. With the French withdrawal and the collapse of
bipolar relations, some African countries see China as a powerful protector who is less
demanding in terms of democratic norms, and less inquisitive about the uses to which
its agreed credits are put 24. On several occasions in July 2004, and again in September,
China threatened to use its UN Security Council veto to block the adoption of political
sanctions and an oil blockade against Sudan over the Darfour conflict. Resolution 1564,
which threatens Khartoum with an oil  blockade,  was only adopted through China’s
abstention, to which it  agreed in exchange for a textual amendment,  mainly giving
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management of  the crisis  to  the African Union.  China also  abstained when the UN
Security Council’s asserted its control over the International Criminal Court in April
2005, in order to bring those responsible for the crimes in Darfour to justice. In return,
China counts on African support for its foreign policy, particularly with regard to its
territorial claims in Chinese waters.
22 African  countries,  especially  those  with  sensitive  relations  with  the  international
community, rely on China, not only to counterbalance pressure from the United States
and France,  as  in  Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville,  but  also  to  end their  international
isolation, and even to supply arms. In 1996, Peking had no compunction in supplying
Sudan with F-7  surveillance  aircraft  (modelled on the  Soviet  Mig  21)  and with Y-8
transport planes (based on the Antonov).  China and Angola have also strengthened
their  military  co-operation,  with  Peking  delivering  light  armoured  vehicles  and
equipment.
Is China just an investor or a predator in Africa ?
23 China’s economic take-off has brought benefits to African countries, giving them a new
export outlet and, more importantly, bringing a welcome and significant rise in the
price of raw materials. Between 1992 and 2002, China’s steel consumption rose by 20%
while the global average was 4%. Mineral ores like nickel and copper, indispensable to
the electrical and electronics industries, have risen considerably since 2001. In 2005 the
price of nickel on the London spot market was 16,255 euros per ton as compared with
3,725  in  December  1998.  China  can  also  take  part  of  the  credit  for  South  Africa’s
economic growth (3.6% in 2002, and 3.7% in 2004) as well as for the improvement of the
financial situation in Algeria and Nigeria (which in 2003 experienced growth rates of
6.8% and 10% respectively). But, as Jean-Pierre Angelier observes, “the current upward
trend is the outcome of conjoined factors ... particularly the simultaneous growth in
the American and Chinese economies. With a growth rate of 3.1% in 2003, the GDP of
the United States increased by US$323 billion in real terms, whereas China’s GDP for
the same year, with a growth rate of 7.8%, increased three times less in real terms (by
US$96 billion) 25.
24 African euphoria is likely to fade soon, owing to the significant rise in the price of
agricultural  products.  African  countries  are  still  major  importers  of  grain,  such  as
maize and wheat. Here too China’s development is palpable, but in a negative direction.
Although the goal of feeding a population of more than a billion has been achieved, the
position of agriculture in China is nonetheless precarious. Admittedly, progress since
the 1960s has been spectacular. China is now the world’s leading wheat producer (91
million tons in 2004), ahead of India, Russia, the United States and France. It is also the
leading producer of rice (176 million tons), ahead of India and Indonesia. In twenty
years  pig  production  has  quadrupled,  and  now  represents  50%  of  total  global
production.
25 But we should not be blinded by these flattering statistics. Not only should the figures
be treated with caution but, above all, the antiquated storage and transport facilities
are  the  cause  of  serious  losses.  In  reality,  production  is  stagnant.  In  1986,  China
produced 177 million tons of rice, and fifteen years later the figure was more or less the
same. In wheat production too China had the same harvests as fifteen years earlier. The
land available for agriculture is particularly restricted (7% of the overall land mass 26)
and is constantly being reduced by urbanisation 27.  Following its membership of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO), China will have to make a big effort to modernise its
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agriculture and produce larger yields. But the results are likely to be disappointingly
undermined by population growth. So in the agricultural domain China is still subject
to  the  need to  import  from the  United  States  and its  allies,  Canada,  Australia  and
Argentina. Agricultural foodstuffs represented 5.3% of total imports in 1998, and 4.5%
in 2001.  But  in real  terms,  the volume of  imported agricultural  food products  rose
steadily, albeit less rapidly than overall imports 28. From 1998 to 2001 the agricultural
deficit  increased  threefold  29.  China  is  the  fourth  largest  importer  of  agricultural
products after the European Union, Japan and the United States 30.  While there are
certainly  some measures  which  can  be  taken  to  alleviate  this dependence  on  food
imports,  through  encouraging  home  production  via  financial  aid  packages  and
increasing prices  to  reduce the  flight  from the countryside,  such remedies  are  not
always adequate. 
26 In reality, several factors in China combine to produce a gloomy forecast. The future is
clouded  by  the  reduction  in  useable  acreage,  the  increasing  scarcity  of  water  for
irrigation,  and  the  rising  standards  of  living  which  are  changing  patterns  of  food
consumption. Increasing grain purchases on the international markets will inevitably
have  negative  consequences  for  Africa.  In  2002-2003,  Morocco,  Algeria  and  Egypt
imported 15 million tons of wheat, mostly from Canada. Sub-Saharan African countries
have little impact on the international grain markets because of the low levels of their
imports, but any price increases will still have serious financial consequences for them.
Nigeria has become the first major African importer of rice, and Africa in general buys
a quarter of global rice imports 31. Although there is currently no fixed global price for
this  cereal  (since  only  6%  of  global  production  is  exported),  the  prices  fixed  by
Thailand, the major global exporter (25%), are a useful benchmark. In Africa, everyone
admits that the price of rice is rising continually. In addition to the increase in world
market prices (averaging 10% since 2001) rising shipping costs are also having their
effect.
27 Similarly, the termination of the multifibre agreement in January 2005 is producing
real anxiety in Africa. Several countries where weaving is a major economic activity,
are fearful of Chinese competition. Textiles are Morocco’s leading export, representing
45% of its industrial employment, but Chinese industrialists can offer prices 50% or 60%
lower than the Moroccans or Tunisians. While the geographical and cultural proximity
of the Maghreb countries to the European Union operates in their favour (allowing
quicker delivery times), this advantage will probably last for only a limited period. In
sum, then, relations between China and some of the countries of Africa do not appear
equitable. In exchange for its construction projects, China sometimes makes demands
that are felt to be excessive, like the granting of large-scale fishing rights.
28 China’s  dynamic  presence  in  Africa  is  therefore  developing  along  several  different
lines. And as Chris Alden emphasises in his paraphrase of the title of Shintaro Ishihara’s
booklet,  “Africa  can  say  no”  32.  African  countries  must  demand  more  equitable
economic relations with China. They should not be satisfied with just exporting their
raw  materials  but  should  receive  technological  transfers  in  exchange.  Taking
advantage of the potential fears aroused by the emergence of China, India is attempting
to offer  African countries  a  more equitable  partnership.  India,  who faces  the same
problem of energy dependence, is unable to rival China in financial terms but offers its
suppliers  technical  co-operation  (such  as  technological  transfers,  the  Sofcomp
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information technology project, medicine sales etc.). This competition between the two
Asian giants could be favourable to the development of the African continent.
NOTES
1. For the relations between China and Africa after decolonisation, see Zhang
Hongming, “La politique africaine de la Chine”, published by the Centre d’étude
d’Afrique noire (CEAN), Bordeaux, 2000, and Jiang Chung-lian, “Le pétrole, nouvelle
dimension des relations sino-africaines”, Géopolitique africaine, No. 14, Spring 2004.
2. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Tazara) linking Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, with
Dar es Salaam, was built in 1975. Nowadays it carries little traffic, owing to its outdated
infrastructure.
3. When it was created by Jonas Savimbi in 1968, the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) was backed by China. But after 1976, this movement
against the Portuguese colonial presence shifted towards the United States.
4. These included building a telephone network in Ethiopia, an airport terminal in
Algeria, the Méroé dam in the Sudan, the Imbouli hydro-electric dam on the Congo
river in Congo-Brazzaville, the Yaoundé Congress Hall, the Lagdo dam in Cameroon, the
Palace of Culture in Abidjan, the National Assembly building in Libreville, etc.
5. In November 2004, SITEX was declared bankrupt and closed down.
6. In 2003, the value of exports from China amounted to US$438 billion, and imports
were US$412 billion.
7. China invested mainly in the copper mines in Zambia (fourth largest producer in the
world) and in Shambezi.
8. Nonetheless, China’s conduct remains pragmatic. In 1991, after the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the Central African Republic and Taiwan, China continued
to respect its commercial contracts, particularly to build the Mbali dam, contradicting
its verbal condemnations.
9. Those who do not have diplomatic relations with Peking, like Liberia and Malawi,
send observers.
10. By the end of 2004, Chinese tourist groups were able to visit Ethiopia, Kenya,
Mauritius, the Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
11. According to the International Energy Agency report, “China’s Worldwide Quest for
Energy Security”, 2000.
12. Between 1991 and 2002, Indonesian oil production fell by 20%.
13. Acronym for Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldavia.
14. Nearly ten years after it was established, GUUAM’s record is very mixed. At the time
of its summit meeting in Yalta in July 2003, Uzbekistan was absent and asked to be
granted observer status only. This decision was because of Tashkent’s desire to
establish better relations with China and Russia. Moreover, Uzbekistan has joined the
rival Shanghai Group organisation. Just before the Yalta summit, the Moldavian
president, Vladimir Voronin, was very pessimistic over the future of GUUAM. This
organisation’s mixed character itself gives rise to a certain scepticism, since the
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priorities and objectives of its members are so diverse. For Georgia and Azerbaijan the
main concern is the control and protection of the pipelines, whereas for Uzbekistan it
is the fight against Islamism. But in recent months this alliance has been resuscitated.
Mikhail Saakashvili’s victory in Georgia in January 2004, followed a year later by Viktor
Yushchenko in Ukraine, suggest that ties with Washington are about to be
strengthened. Early this year, Vladimir Voronin announced a major turn in his
country’s foreign policy by setting the goal of joining the European Union. Finally, the
Tulip Revolution in Kirghizistan has strengthened American influence in the region,
and holds out the possibility of expanding GUUAM still further.
15. According to the “BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2004”, 90% of all African
oil reserves are in Libya, Nigeria and Angola.
16. In ten days, the American president visited South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, Rwanda,
Uganda and Senegal.
17. According to the WTO report for 2003, the United States imports 14% of its oil from
Africa (5.8% from Nigeria, 3.2% from Angola, and 1.9% from Gabon) as opposed to 18%
from the Middle East, and 30% from Latin America.
18. The exploitation of the Doba basin reserves began in October 2003, and by next year
it should allow Chad to double its financial reserves. The N’Djamena government has
entrusted this project (involving the extraction of 30,000 tons per day) to an
international consortium consisting of the American companies Exxon Mobil (40%) and
Chevron (25%), along with the Malaysian Petronas (35%).
19. From 1997 to 2004, Equatorial Guinea’s oil production expanded nearly six-fold,
reaching 17.4 million tons per year, slightly above Gabon’s level (12 million).
20. Just like China, India’s fuel dependency will continue to increase. By 2006, 75% of its
oil requirements will have to be imported.
21. Jiang Chung-lian, “Pékin et Taïpeh : les enjeux africains”, Géopolitique africaine, No.
10, Spring 2003, pp. 239-254.
22. Chris Alden and Garth Shelton emphasise that Taipei made generous campaign
donations to the ANC in 1994 ; see “Camarades, Parias et hommes d’affaires”, Politique
africaine, No. 76, December 1999, pp. 18-29.
23. In 2003, trade between Africa and Taiwan was worth a total of US$4 billion dollars,
of which 31.8% was with South Africa, 18.8% with Angola, 13.5% with Congo, 11.3% with
Nigeria, and 5.8% with Egypt.
24. In his article “La Chine à l’assaut du marché africain”, Le Monde diplomatique, May
2005, pp. 6-7, Jean-Christophe Servant points to the case of Angola, where a part of
Chinese aid will probably go towards the electoral campaign by president Dos Santos’
MPLA in 2006.
25. Jean-Pierre Angelier, “Croissance chinoise et marchés mondiaux de matières
premières”, Politique étrangère, Vol. 69, No. 2, Summer 2004, p. 317.
26. China has to feed 20% of the world’s population with less than 10% of its arable
land.
27. China’s usable agricultural land is particularly restricted, standing at 0.08 hectares
per head, compared with 1.8 in Russia, 1.75 in the USA, and 0.19 in India. For a
discussion of the food situation in China, see Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Vers une crise
alimentaire en Chine et dans le monde ? Entretien exclusif avec Lester Brown”, 
Perspectives chinoises, No. 42, July-August 1997, pp. 11-20.
28. Between 1998 and 2001, China’s total imports multiplied by 1.4, but its agricultural
food imports multiplied by only 1.2.
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29. See the FAO report, “Compendium d’indicateurs sur l’alimentation et l’agriculture
en 2003”.
30. China is already the world’s leading importer of soya beans. It has an agricultural
deficit which in 2002 amounted to US$3.45 billion. By way of comparison, the European
Union’s agricultural surplus was US$20 billion and the US surplus was US$2.75 billion.
31. Nigeria, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Benin and South Africa account for 10% of global rice
purchases. Rice production is subject to climatic swings and can vary considerably.
China was an importer of rice in 1995, and an exporter in 1998, 1999 and 2000. Although
China is only number six among the world’s rice importers, its purchases are rising
steadily, from 172,000 tons in 1999 to 339,000 tons in 2002, and 404,000 tons in 2003. See
International Rice Research Institute, http ://www.irri.org..
32. Chris Alden, “Leveraging the Dragon : Towards “An Africa That Can Say No”,
http ://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article ?id=5336, March 1st 2005.
RÉSUMÉS
China and the African continent are currently celebrating the renewal of their partnership. For
China Africa is a source of coal and oil, and for the African states China is an ideal commercial
partner that  imposes no special  political  conditions upon its  suppliers,  and even gives  them
diplomatic backing. But Sino-African relations come into conflict with the interests of the United
States, itself concerned about diversifying the sources of its oil imports. A key issue here is that
Africa’s enthusiasm for China may rapidly fade, because in time rises in agricultural prices will
have a negative impact on African economies.
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